This study examines the information value of corporate insider trading disclosures for a sample of 2,108 public traded companies located in seven (continental) European countries. Our results indicate that insiders selling (buying) stocks in their own company reveal negative (positive) information about the intrinsic firm value. This general observation is mainly driven by German law countries and declines over time. In addition, stock prices of smaller companies react stronger to insider transactions. Furthermore, insiders tend to time their trades, selling shares after stock price increases and buying shares after stock price decreases.
Introduction
Insider trading occurs when corporate insiders, like e.g. managers or members of the supervisory board buy or sell stocks of their own company. The trading activities of these insiders are not forbidden, however, the use of insider knowledge in such transactions is illegal. To protect the public and to improve market transparency, the disclosure of corporate insider trading is an important aspect in a modern financial system. The Beginning with the Financial Services Action Plan that started in 1999, the European Community recognized the need of further regulatory measures to achieve the desired single integrated and efficient market in financial services. In particular it was realized that market abuse -with insider trading being a special form of market abuse -threatens the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in securities and needs im- The Lamfalussy Process is an approach to the development of financial service industry regulation in the EU. It is named after the chair of the EU advisory committee that created the process. The Lamfalussy reports can be viewed online at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_markets/securities/lamfalussy/index_en.htm tive 89/592/EC, though it and its collateral initiatives rely heavily on the regulations of the former directive to legally define insiders and insider information 3 . The directive 2003/6/EC requires each member state to establish a single regulatory and supervisory authority to address insider dealing and market manipulation. The overall aim is to introduce an EU standard for insider dealing and market manipulation so as to promote market integrity and investor confidence in the financial markets. 4, 5 Under article 18 of the EU 'market abuse' directive EU member states are forced to implement local regulations that require the disclosure of corporate insider trading till October, 12 th 2004. The non EU-member Switzerland implemented a similar regulation that closely follows the definitions of the EU regulation.
The directive requires corporate insiders to immediately disclose their trades. The implementations specify "immediately" within the range of 2 days (Switzerland) to 5 days (Germany, Netherlands), i.e. insiders must disclose their trades within this range of trading days after buying or selling took place. This delay of up to five trading days is, e.g., Many empirical studies on insider trading activities document that insiders (and to some extend also outsiders that follow insider transactions) are able to earn significant abnormal returns during the first weeks or even month after trading. This is true for early (see, e.g., Jaffe (1974) , Finnerty (1976 ), or Seyhun (1986 ) and also recent U.S. studies This is also briefly mentioned in the Market Abuse Directive to be the reason for prohibiting insider dealing.
5
A comprehensive analysis of the Market Abuse Directive is provided in Siems (2008). 6 It is important to note that till July 2002 the delay between insider transaction and disclosure has been much longer in the US. According to Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, insiders were required to report their transactions by the tenth day of the calendar month following the trading month. E.g., Aktas et al. (2008) report for their sample of U.S. insider deals an average delay of 22 days.
(like, e.g., Lakonishok and Lee (2001) , Jeng et al. (2003) , or Aktas et al. (2008) ). Comparable results are also documented for some European markets, like the UK (see, e.g., Pope et al. (1990) , Gregory et al. (1994) , and more recently Calvo and Lasfer (2002), or Fidrmuc et al. (2006) ), the Netherlands (see Biesta at al. (2003) and Aktas et al (2007) ),
or Spain (see Del Brio et al. (2002) ). Eckbo and Smith (1999) report zero or even negative abnormal returns for insider transaction in Norway. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on insider trading disclosure and presents our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes our database and in section 4 we explain the used research design. Section 5 presents the empirical results and concluding remarks are set out in section 6.
Literature review and hypotheses
Previous studies on insider trading highlight the ability of corporate insiders to predict the cross-sectional variation of future stock returns. Beginning with Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) and Jaffe (1974) , academics focused on how informative insider trades are. A typical research design consists of the definition of a trading rule relying for example on the number of shares bought or sold by insiders during a month. Purchase and sale portfolios are then created according to the specified trading rule. All these studies conclude nearly unanimously that purchase portfolios outperform relevant benchmarks, 6 whereas results for sale portfolios are not that explicit. The lack of significant negative abnormal returns after insider sales is commonly attributed to increased legal risk associated with insider sales before a drop in share price.
Another approach was implemented by Jeng et al. (1999) . The authors focus on the estimation of the returns earned by insiders. They construct purchase and sale portfolios directly based on the insiders' decisions and report abnormal returns of 50 basis points per month for the purchase portfolio whereas the sale portfolio does not earn abnormal profits.
Studies by other authors focus on trading strategies implemented by insiders. It is noteworthy that insiders are unmasked as contrarian investors -a hint that they might base their trading decisions upon private information. Kose and Lang (1991) provide evidence of insider strategically buying shares around dividend announcements. Huddart et al. (2000) present an insider's equilibrium trading strategy in a multi-period rational expectations framework. They offer dissimulation as an explanation for contrarian trading by insiders maximizing profits. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) investigate the extent to which the trading by corporate insiders influences the information impounded into stock prices. Aktas et al. (2008) analyse the connection between information content of legal insider trading and market efficiency. In using a sample of 59,244 insider transactions in 2,110 companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange Aktas et al. (2008) provide an indication that insider trading activity accelerates price discovery. In a recent study Jiang and Zaman (2007) decompose realized market returns to test whether insider act as contrarian investors or whether they time their trades. Their findings indicate that insiders time the market because of their superior knowledge about the company.
However, the vast majority of previous work focused on U.S. capital markets and sparse research was done on insider trading in other countries. Wong et al. (2000) For a two year sample of 2,522 insider transactions Betzer and Theissen (2007) show that insider deals are associated with significant abnormal returns. This is especially the case for deals that took place prior to earnings announcements, when the informational asymmetry between insiders and outsiders tends to be highest. To protect minority shareholders it might therefore be a good advice to prohibit insiders from trading before earnings announcement, as it is e.g. already the case in the UK.
Dymke and Walter (2007) relate insider transactions to ad-hoc news disclosures. They document for a sample of 3,079 German deals that insiders trade on inside information.
Most active in exploiting inside information are supervisory board members. They tend to realize high profits with their frequent front-running transactions. Klinge et al. (2005) help to explain differences in financial development. La 1998 Table 1 provides for our sample of seven countries a summary of the corresponding information on regulatory authority, legislation, and public disclosure requirement dates.
*** Insert Table 1 Generally speaking, in the seven countries disclosures of insider trading activities have to be submitted in electronic form to the respective authorities which in turn publishes this information on their websites. 8 We use this various (official) online databases to download insider disclosures and to create our database. 
Descriptive statistics
To ensure the integrity of the dataset we have to control for double counting of insider trades. We further remove announcements that contain obvious errors, like having the day of disclosure before the day of trading. After these quality checks our dataset contains 29,219 insider purchase transactions and 22,989 insider sale transactions.
In addition, we aggregate all purchase (sale) deals in the same security that took place on the same trading day. Such trading patterns might be due to partial execution of orders and do not convey additional information. But in our view there is a difference between one insider buying (selling) and more insiders buying (selling) on a specific date:
if more insiders buy (sell) this may conveys more information than if only one insider trades, therefore we count the number of insiders buying (selling) in the same security on a specific date and add this variable to our multivariate analysis.
We furthermore limit our study on insiders buying or selling shares of their companythus we ignore all transactions in other securities like derivatives and equity funds. In total this leads to a database containing 8,649 buy and 7,739 sell transactions for corporate insiders in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland from July 2 nd , 2002 until December 31 st , 2007 (see Table 2 ). Purchases take place in 1,687 and sales in 1,592 companies. EUR 145,500). The overall volume is EUR 24,281.5 Mio for purchase transactions and EUR 39,647.9 Mio for sale transactions (see Table 3 ). The fact that the volume of sale transactions exceeds the volume of purchase transactions is consistent with findings in prior studies and provides evidence of performance-related managerial remuneration like stocks and stock options. *** Insert Table 3 about here *** Corporate insiders are forced by national law to disclose their transactions on the trading days following the trade. Future research concerning the price movements in the period after the trade and before the disclosure might therefore be of interest. Figure 1 shows the development of declared insider trades for our total sample of seven countries, and reveals that the number of insider transactions significantly increased over time.
*** Insert Figure 1 about here ***
Stock quotes
We gather stock quotes from Reuters Xtra 3000. Altogether, we have daily quotes for 2,108 companies where insider trading occurred in the research period (July 2002 -December 2007 . Daily stock returns are calculated by taking into account dividend payments and corporate actions, like stock splits or SEOs.
We evaluate the information effects of insider trading disclosures with various subsamples. To calculate the market reaction for small and large companies, groups of small and large companies are constructed along the median of the companies' market value at the time of the insider trading disclosure. To avoid country and time biases we construct these sub-samples for every country in every year. Afterwards these country and year specific sub-samples are re-aggregated to form the large (small) company subsamples.
In addition, we construct another sub-sample to evaluate whether the transaction size has an impact on the price performance. We define purchase (sale) transactions as large transaction if the transaction volume is greater than the median transaction volume of all purchases (sales) that occur in a specific country in a specific year. Small purchase and sales transactions are defined correspondingly.
To calculate market adjusted returns the following indices are used to proxy for country specific market returns: (1) Austria: WBI, (2) Belgium: BEL20, (3) France: SBF250, (4) Germany: CDAX, (5) Italy: MIBTEL, (6) the Netherlands: AEX, and (7) Switzerland:
SPI.
Research design

Methodology
To measure the price effects of legal insider trading disclosures we adopt an event-study design. Even though event-study like research design has been applied since the early nineteen-thirtees (MacKinley (1997) mentions research done by Dolley in 1933 about the price effects of stock splits), only after the seminal papers of Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) the event-study methodology attained a larger diffusion among the academic community. But since then, academics and practitioners produced many event studies in nearly every field of economics ranging from seasoned equity offers to the effects on firm value due to a changing regulatory environment (see MacKinley (1997)). Usually, event studies use financial data to measure the effects of an event on the value of a firm. Granted that market participants are rational, they will react to the event and their reaction will make the security's price change. We apply the common event study approach and design delineated in MacKinley (1997) and in Campbell et al. (1997) .
In this analysis we focus on short-term effects of disclosures of legal insider transactions. There should not be any price reaction observable unless either market partici-pants assess insider disclosures contain information not yet issued by the company and
therefore not yet incorporated into stock prices or insiders are able to time their transactions.
Event definition
Following Campbell et al. (1997) we use 120 trading days to estimate the market model parameters. In order to get a better understanding of the price dynamics around the disclosure date, we use multiple event windows. The event we analyze is the disclosure of insider transactions and the corresponding disclosure day is labeled as T 0 for every event. The research period is measured in trading days, therefore T 1 denotes the first trading day after the event, T 2 denotes the second trading day after the event, and so forth.
In a first step, we investigate the 20, 10 and 5 trading day intervals before the insider trading disclosure to grasp the evolution of the security's price before the announcement. The price movements in these intervals may include valuable information for the analysis because the price movements by themselves might persuade the insiders to trade. In addition, we analyze the 5, 10 and 20 trading days following the disclosure date -that is one, two and four trading weeks after T 0 . This analysis enables us to assess the market's reaction to the disclosure of insider transactions.
Abnormal returns
To measure the effect of insider trading disclosures on market prices we calculate abnormal returns for the respective securities. Ex-post abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between returns of the relevant company and the return one would expect without the event.
where r it is the observed return of stock i on day t, E[.] the expectation value operator and ε it represents the abnormal return of company i on day t.
In rearranging (1) we get a direct measure for the abnormal return:
For every day of the event period we calculate the average abnormal return of all stocks that experience the event. The average abnormal return (AR) for trading day t is calculate as follows:
By cumulating the one-day AR from (3) over a particular time interval we obtain the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR). The average CAR for a specific period is calculated as the sum of all average ARs between τ 1 and τ 2 .
To estimate normal (or expected) returns we use the market model approach. The market model for security i and observation t is defined as
where r mt represents the return of the market portfolio (in our case the corresponding market index of the relevant country; see section 3.3) for trading day t. A linear OLS regression and a 120 trading day estimation window prior to the event window is used to estimate the model parameter α i and β i . Subsequently abnormal returns are calculated using financial market data observed during the event window. The abnormal return vector is calculated as follows: 
Significance of abnormal returns
We perform three types of statistical tests to examine the significance of abnormal re- 
Empirical results
Abnormal returns around the disclosure date
Consistent with the findings in previous research insiders in our sample of seven (continental) European countries emerge as contrarian investors. They tend to sell securities after periods of high abnormal returns. For the total sample of 7,739 insider sale transactions the average CAR is 1.61% (significantly different from zero at the 1% level) for the last twenty trading days before the announcement date. In contrast to findings for the U.S., prices decline significantly after the announcement of insider transactions.
Strictly speaking, prices start to decline after the announcement date (day T 0 ). *** Insert Table 4 about here *** After the disclosure of insider's selling activities prices decline almost linearly: the average (median) CAR is -0.40% (-0.46) for T 0 -T 5 , -0.82% (-0.79%) for T 0 -T 10 , and -1.67% (-1.43%) for T 0 -T 20 . The proportion test reveals that 20 trading days after the disclosure a significant portion of more than 59% of all sale transactions are associated with a negative CAR. As the abnormal performance after insider sale transactions are disclosed is significantly negative we can accept hypothesis 1b. The fact that abnormal security prices decline after insider sale transactions implies that corporate insiders do not fear the legal hazard inherent in insider trading based on private information about unfavorable development of the company.
In contrast, insiders tend to buy stocks of their companies after periods of negative abnormal returns. For the period T -20 -T -1 (i.e., the twenty day period prior to the insider transaction disclosure) we observe a significant average (median) CAR of -2.05% (- 
Abnormal returns vs. realized returns
Following recent research done by Jiang and Zaman (2007) we also decompose abnormal returns and calculate in addition to CARs also cumulative realized returns (CRRs).
Panel A of Figure 3 shows that the market tends to significantly increase after insider purchase transactions, as the CRRs grow stronger than the corresponding CARs after the disclosure date. This indicates that insiders not only reveal pricing relevant information but that they also seem to time their purchase deals. In this section we examine the market reaction to insider transaction disclosures within several sub samples. Other studies show that market reactions depend both on the size of the insider transaction and on the market value of the insider's company. To account for the effect of transaction volume we form purchase (sale) sub-samples according to the median of overall purchase (sale) transaction volume for every country in every year. Furthermore, we form purchase (sale) sub-samples according to the median market value in a specific country in a specific year.
Transaction size
To account for the effects of transaction volume we form purchase ( Table 5 about here *** This indicates that -compared to the total sample -large insider purchase transactions take place after a somewhat smaller (relative) stock price decline, but are not associated with a significantly better abnormal performance after the disclosure date. On the other hand, large insider sale transactions take place after a slightly larger (relative) stock price increase. The negative performance after the disclosure date is a little bit less pronounced compared to the total sample, but is still significantly negative. I.e., smaller insider trades generate a larger post disclosure increase for insider purchase deals and a larger post disclosure decreases for insider sale transactions.
Firm size
One expects larger companies to have a more efficient information policy than smaller companies. Large companies are more heavily followed by financial analysts and have a larger fraction of institutional stockholders -facts that typically reduce information asymmetries. This expectation is confirmed by our findings. Insider trading activity is substantial in large companies. For large companies we have 4,462 insider purchases in 971 companies and 4,177 insider sales in 866 companies whereas in small companies we have 4,187 insider purchases in 804 companies and 3,562 insider sales in 771 companies.
For purchase transactions by corporate insiders in large companies we find significant average CARs of -2.08% (-1.27%) for T -20 -T -1 (T -10 -T -1 ), significant average CARs of 0.25% for T 0 -T 10 , and insignificant average CARs of -0.01 for T 0 -T 20 (see Panel A of Table 6 ). For the corresponding sale transactions we find significant average CARs of 1.24% (0.80%) for T -20 -T -1 (T -10 -T -1 ) and significant average CARs of -0.71% (-
1.40%) for T 0 -T 10 (T 0 -T 20 ).
*** Insert Table 6 Table 6 ).
These observations indicate that insider sales in large companies take place after a smaller (relative) price increase (see also Figure 5 ). But the (relative) decline prior to insider purchase transactions in small and large firms are nearly the same. These results also reveal that insider transactions in small companies disclose more pricing relevant information than in large companies. Hence, the (relative) price drop after a sale is disclosed is larger than for small firms. The abnormal performance after an insider purchase is significantly positive for small firms, whereas it is nearly zero for large firms. *** Insert Figure 5 about here ***
Multivariate analysis
To further investigate possible determinants of the performance after insider trading disclosures, we perform a multivariate cross-sectional analysis with CAR 0,20 (cumula- 
A higher book-to-market ratio is an indication for undervaluation. We therefore expect a positive association between CAR 0,20 and the book-to-market ratio. 
The country shortcuts for the countries are based on the first two digits of a country's International Securities Identification Number (ISIN), whereby DE=Germany, AT=Austria, CH=Switzer-land, BE=Belgium, FR=France, IT=Italy, NL=the Netherlands. Equation (8) is used to estimate model 2 (purchase transactions) and model 5 (sale transactions), and equation (9) is used to estimate model 3 (purchase transactions) and model 6 (sale transactions). Table 7 presents the results for the estimated models 1, 2, and 3 for insider purchase transactions. Consistent with hypothesis 2a, the overall positive CAR 0,20 (see Table 4 ) is negatively associated with the variable Time. This indicates that the positive (relative) price effect after insider purchase transactions decreases over time. In addition, a prior insider buying transaction (Prior Purchase -20,-1 ) tends to increase CAR 0,20 (i.e., two purchase transactions in a row; but coefficient is not significant), whereas a prior insider selling transaction (Prior Sale -20,-1 ) leads to a significantly lower CAR 0,20 . *** Insert Table 7 about here *** Table 7 further reveals that the number of insiders trading on the same day and the (relative) transaction volume have no significant influence on CAR 0,20 . On the other hand, the coefficient for firm size is significantly negative. This implies, consistent with hypothesis 3a, that larger firms (with probably lower informational asymmetry) are associated with a lower CAR 0,20 than smaller firms. This observation is also consistent with our univariate results (see Table 6 ). In addition, undervalued firms (higher book-tomarket ratio) experience (in line with our expectations) a significantly higher abnormal performance during the first 20 trading days.
Interesting is the significantly positive coefficient for the variable legal origin. This means that in German law countries the informational asymmetry between outside investors and corporate insider (especially managers and supervisory board members) are significantly larger than in French law countries, resulting in a stronger positive (abnormal) price reaction after an insider purchase transaction is disclosed. Model 2 further reveals that this observation holds for all three of our German law countries. In contrast, model 3 shows that all our four French law countries are negatively associated with the (relative) post insider purchase price performance. This is especially the case for Belgium and Italy. Based on these results we have to reject hypothesis 6a: The legal origin significantly affects the (relative) price performance after an insider purchase transaction. Table 8 Table 8 about here *** In addition, the number of insiders selling on the same trading day is significant negative associated with CAR 0,20 , consistent with hypothesis 5b. Therefore, more selling insiders tend to provide more pricing relevant information. In contrast to the prediction of hypothesis 4b, a larger transaction volume has a significantly positive influence on the post transaction performance. This implies that smaller insider trades are more informative compared to larger trades. This observation is a bit surprising, but is in line with the corresponding univariate results (see Table 5 ).
In line with hypothesis 3b, the coefficient of firm size is significantly positive. Larger firms experience after an insider sale transaction a better performance than smaller firms do. And undervalued firms (higher book-to-market ratio) are positively associated with CAR 0,20 , which is also in line with our expectations.
Model 4 also shows a significantly negative coefficient for the variable legal origin. This is again in line with the corresponding hypothesis (6b). In German law countries investors seem to interpret an insider sale transaction as negative information for the firm value, causing a negative abnormal post transaction performance. In this context, model 5 reveals that this process only applies for Germany but not for our two other German law countries, Austria and Switzerland. Both have positive (insignificant) coefficients.
Model 6 finally exhibits that all of our four French law countries are positively associated with the (relative) post insider sale price performance. This is especially the case for Italy and the Netherlands.
Conclusion
We assess the efficiency of corporate information policy by looking at market reactions to disclosures of insider trading. Our research focuses on more than 16,000 insider trad- Consistent with prior studies we document contrarian investment strategies among insider transactions. For our seven country sample we find evidence of negative market reactions to insider sales, and less pronounced (but still significant) positive market reactions to insider purchases transactions. The latter is a somewhat astonishing result, as research on insider trading in the U.S. suggests that insiders are much more cautious at sale transactions and abstain to make use of their private information advantage in sale transactions. The literature argues that the reason for this behavior lies most probably in the increased litigation risk associated with insider sales.
In this context we further document that the legal origin of the countries in our sample can significantly contribute to explain the observable abnormal price reactions to insider trades. Our results reveal that in German law countries insider purchase transactions tend to disclose positive pricing relevant information, whereas this is not the case in French law countries. Interestingly, the negative abnormal performance following insider sale transactions is primarily observable for insider trades in German firms. This observation of a significantly negative abnormal price effect after German insider sale transactions is in line with previous studies investigating such deals, like, e.g., Betzer and Theissen (2007) . The absence of class-action lawsuits in German legislation might explain this observation.
Another interesting finding of our research is that insider purchase transactions in small companies convey more information for outsiders than in large companies. We conclude that information policy is more efficient in larger companies than in smaller ones. This may be due to the fact that larger firms are followed by more analysts and therefore are forced to provide more and more often (pricing relevant) information to the public.
We further observe that the magnitude of abnormal price reactions to insider sale and purchase transactions declines over time, which might indicate an increase in pricing Step 2: Because we are interested in the announcement effects of legal insider trading we aggregate disclosures of all insiders made on the same day concerning the same financial security -16,238 -366 -495 -2476 -4,314 -6,216 -1,840 -531 Number of remaining purchase transactions after
Step 2 12 The variable CAR 0,20 in % (cumulative abnormal return for the first 21 trading days after the date of disclosure (including the date of disclosure)) is used as dependent variable. Time is one for the year 2002, 2 for the year 2003, and so forth, and 6 for the year 2007. Prior purchase (sale) is a dummy variable coded one if insiders bought (sold) stocks in their own company during the last 20 trading days prior to the date of disclosure (=day 0). Both variables are used to control for price effects of prior insider purchase and sale transactions. MCap is the market capitalization on day 0. Firm size is defined as the logarithm of market capitalization on day 0. The classification of the Legal Origin is based on La Porta et al. (1998) . In our sample Germany, Austria, and Switzerland are German law countries, and Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands are French law countries. Coefficients significant at the 5%-level are marked bold. 
